This paper studies the quantitative implications of changes in the composition of taxes for long-run growth and expected lifetime utility in the UK economy over 1970-2005. Our setup is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model incorporating a detailed …scal policy structure, and where the engine of endogenous growth is human capital accumulation. The government's spending instruments include public consumption, investment and education spending. On the revenue side, labour, capital and consumption taxes are employed. Our results suggest that if the goal of tax policy is to promote long-run growth by altering relative tax rates, then it should reduce labour taxes while simultaneously increasing capital or consumption taxes to make up for the loss in labour tax revenue. In contrast, a welfare promoting policy would be to cut capital taxes, while concurrently increasing labour or consumption taxes to make up for the loss in capital tax revenue.
Introduction
The relationship between the government's tax structure (distribution of revenue by type of tax) and the economy's long-run growth rate has always received a great deal of theoretical and empirical attention (see e.g. Turnovsky (1995) at theoretical level and Auerbach (2006) at policy level). A robust …nding of the literature, based on calibrated dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models, is that the growth e¤ects of tax reforms are likely to be small (see e.g. Lucas (1990) and Stokey and Rebelo (1995) ). There has also been a lot of empirical work conducted on the link between growth rates and tax structure (see, e.g. Mendoza et al. (1997) and also Angelopoulos et al. (2007a) for a recent review of this literature). Broadly consistent with the …ndings of the quantitative DGE models, the preponderance of estimation evidence suggests that tax reform has either small or insigni…cant e¤ects on growth.
In contrast to research on tax structure and growth, much less work has been undertaken on the welfare e¤ects of altering the tax policy mix. Notable exceptions include the U.S. DGE studies by Lucas (1990) , Cooley and Hansen (1992) and the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) study by McGrattan (1994) . These papers conclude, in contrast to the growth studies discussed above, that the welfare e¤ects of reforming the tax structure can be substantial.
The broad issue of tax reform and its economics consequences has recently moved back to centre stage in U.K. academic and policy circles (see e.g. the ongoing research for the Mirrlees Review, available at the IFS website). Despite this increased interest, we are not aware of any quantitative studies which attempt to assess the general equilibrium growth and welfare e¤ects of the tax structure on the UK economy.
In light of the above, in this paper, we conduct tax policy analysis for the UK economy over 1970-2005 using a DSGE setup. Our model is a stochastic variant of Lucas' (1990) well-known model in which human capital accumulation is the engine of endogenous growth. We extend Lucas'model in four ways. First, by allowing for a more realistic disaggregation of government spending into its basic growth and utility enhancing activities, i.e. public investment, education and consumption. Second, by including a consumption tax 1 , which allows us to examine the growth and welfare tradeo¤s between income (capital and labor) and consumption taxes, as in e.g. Cooley and Hansen (1992) 2 . Third, by allowing for externalities from per 1 Note that taxes on goods and services constitute about 28.5% of total tax revenue in the UK, see, e.g. IMF Government Finance Statistics. 2 Cooley and Hansen (1992) work with a di¤erent (deterministic) model, which does 2 capita aggregate human capital (see e.g. Lucas (1988) and Tamura (1991) ). Fourth, by allowing for uncertainty when calculating welfare as in e.g. McGrattan (1994) . 3 Our welfare evaluations (where welfare is measured as expected lifetime utility of the representative household) follow recent developments in micro-founded DSGE models applied mainly in examining the welfare implications of di¤erent (monetary and …scal) stabilization policies (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004, 2007) ). However these papers do not consider the welfare e¤ects of the tax structure and also do not allow for (endogenous) growth.
In our analysis, we focus on two types of policy experiments. First, the case in which changes in one of the three distorting tax rates (capital, labour, consumption) are met by changes in lump-sum transfers/taxes. Working vis-a-vis the benchmark case in which a lump-sum policy instrument is the residually adjusted variable, helps us to identify and understand the e¤ects of each distorting tax policy instrument. Second, the more interesting case in which changes in one of the three distorting tax rates are met by changes in another distorting tax rate. Working in this way, allows us to assess the e¤ects of changing the composition of distorting tax rates.
The results of our analysis suggest that if the goal of tax policy is to promote long-run growth by replacing one distorting tax rate with another, then it should reduce labour taxes, while simultaneously increasing capital or consumption taxes to make up for the loss in labour tax revenue. Lucas (1990) also reports negative e¤ects on the growth rate by increasing the labour tax, while decreasing the capital tax. This is because human capital is an engine of endogenous growth. However, both in Lucas (1990) and here, the growth e¤ects of changes in the relative tax rates are small. For instance, if the tax rate on labour is reduced by about 10%, the net growth rate would increase to about 2.43% (when the capital tax increases) or to about 2.42% (when the consumption tax increases), from the data average of 2.41%. Our results are hence consistent with the …ndings in Stokey and Rebelo (1995) , who compare the growth e¤ects of the tax structure in di¤erent models and conclude that these e¤ects are likely to be around the range suggested by Lucas (1990) . not consider human capital and does not allow for endogenous growth. Hence, they do not examine the growth e¤ects of the tax structure. In addition, they focus (as in Lucas (1990) ) in discrete tax reforms, i.e. in changes in the tax structure involving setting one tax rate to zero, whereas we focus on changes in the tax rates that are within the historical experience of the UK.
In contrast, if the goal of tax policy is to promote welfare, then policy makers should cut capital taxes, while concurrently increasing labour or consumption taxes to make up for the loss in capital tax revenue. For instance, the welfare gains of substituting the capital tax with the labour tax are about 1% of extra consumption in each time period for a 10% decrease in the capital tax. Again, the UK results are similar in magnitude to those reported for the USA by Lucas (1990) . The welfare gains from decreasing the capital tax by 10% and increasing the consumption tax to make up for the loss in tax revenue is about 1.5% of extra consumption in each time period. There are also welfare gains from substituting the labour tax with the consumption tax, of the order of 0.25% for a 10% decrease in the labour tax.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 discusses the data, calibration and the long run solution. Section 4 contains the results and Section 5 concludes. Additionally, an Appendix presents information on the second-order welfare function.
Theoretical Model
In this section, building on Lucas'(1990) model, we present and solve a DSGE model in which the engine of endogenous, long-term growth is human capital accumulation. 4 To conduct our policy analysis, in comparison to the Lucas setup, we add: (a) Externalities generated by the average stock of human capital in the society. This can in turn justify public education expenditure. (b) A rather detailed spending-tax mix on the part of the government. Speci…cally, the government spends on education, infrastructure investment, public consumption and lump-sum transfers. On the other side of the budget, the government imposes taxes on capital income, labour income and private consumption spending. 5 (c) We operate in a stochastic environment which allows us to account for the e¤ects of uncertainty on welfare.
The general equilibrium solution of the model consists of a system of dynamic relations jointly specifying the paths of output, private consump-tion, private physical capital, the growth rate of human capital, the fractions of time allocated to work, education and leisure, public capital, and one residually determined policy instrument. To obtain these paths, we solve the second-order approximation of our model's equilibrium conditions around the deterministic steady-state (see also e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004)). In contrast to solutions which impose certainty equivalence, the solution of the second-order system allows us to take account of the uncertainty agents face when making decisions. More importantly, as pointed out by Woodford (2003) , Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and many others, the second-order approximation to the model's policy function helps to avoid potential spurious welfare rankings which may arise under certainty equivalence. In other words, when we evaluate di¤erent policies and regimes, we will approximate both the equilibrium solution and welfare (de…ned as the conditional expectation of lifetime utility) to second-order (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007)). This represents a departure from the earlier literature (see e.g. Lucas (1990) and Cooley and Hansen (1992) ).
Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households indexed by the superscript h and identical …rms indexed by the superscript f , where h; f = 1; 2; :::; N t . The population size, N t , evolves at a constant rate n 1, so that N t+1 = nN t where N 0 is given. Each household's preferences are given by the following time-separable function:
public consumption in composite consumption. The way we model composite consumption is as in e.g. Ashauer (1985) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) .
Each household h saves in the form of investment, I 
where 0 c t ; k t ; l t < 1 are respectively the tax rates on consumption, capital income and labour income.
Each household's physical and human evolve according to:
and
where, 0 p ; h 1 are constant depreciation rates on private physical and human capital respectively. The second expression on the r.h.s. of (5), consisting of three multiplicative terms, can be interpreted as the quantity of "new"human capital created at time period t. This expression is comprised of the following arguments: (i) e 
The Euler-equations for private physical capital, K p;h t+1 , and human capital, H h t+1 , are:
io :
household public education share, g e t , is consistent with the goal of public education policy in practice, as well as with theoretical work (see e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Blankenau (2005) ). Blankenau (2005, pp. 493-4) also has a good discussion of the e¤ects of public education on students'achievement. As he points out, assuming a positive e¤ect is not uncontroversial, this is why public expenditures "are included with a parameter 2 to gauge their relative importance in producing human capital". 8 The parameter restrictions in (5) imply increasing returns to scale (IRS) at the social level. Lucas (1988) and Benhabib and Perli (1994) are examples of other studies which employ the IRS assumption in either or both the physical and human capital production functions. Finally, note that following e.g. Lucas (1988) , we assume that human capital is basically the only private input in human capital accumulation.
Firms
To produce its homogenous …nal product, Y f t , each …rm f chooses private physical capital, K p:f t , and e¤ective labour, u f t H f t ; and also takes advantage of public infrastructure. The production function of each …rm f is:
where e A t A t (k g t ) 2 represents total factor productivity, where A t is an exogenous stochastic process whose motion is de…ned below, and k g t is average (per …rm) public infrastructure capital expressed in e¢ ciency units (see below). The parameters 0 < 1 < 1; 0 < (1 1 ) < 1 and 0 2 < 1 capture the productivity of private capital, private labour and public infrastructure respectively. 9 Firms act competitively by taking prices, policy variables and aggregate outcomes as given. Accordingly, subject to (11), each …rm f chooses K p;f t and u 
The resulting familiar …rst-order conditions are:
Government budget constraint
Total expenditure on public consumption, G use a balanced budget. Ignoring public debt is not critical here since changes in lump-sum taxes/transfers are equivalent to debt …nancing (see e.g. Baxter and King (1993) ). Also note that public capital (K g t ) evolves according to:
where, 0 g 1 is a constant depreciation rate on public capital.
Stationary decentralized competitive equilibrium
Given the paths of six of the seven policy instruments and initial conditions for the state variables, (
; a decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) is de…ned to be a sequence of allocations fC t ; u t ; e t ; K
t=0 , prices fr t ; w t g 1 t=0 and one policy instrument, such that (i) households maximize utility; (ii) …rms maximize pro…ts; (iii) all markets clear; and (iv) the government budget constraint is satis…ed in each time period.
Market clearing values will be denoted without the superscripts h; f .
Since the model allows for long-term growth, we transform variables to make them stationary. We …rst de…ne per capita quantities for any variable X as X t X t =N t , where X t (Y t ; C t ; K p 1 t=0 and substituting for t and t+1 in (8) and (10) respectively, we obtain the following per capita stationary DCE:
2 (17c)
where t and t are the transformed shadow prices associated with (3) and (5) respectively in the household's problem. 10 Therefore, the stationary DCE is summarized by the above system of ten equations in the paths of t , y t , c t , u t ; e t , k p t+1 , k g t+1 ; t , t , and one residually determined policy instrument. This equilibrium is given the assumed policy regime and the paths of exogenous stochastic variables which are de…ned below.
Alternative tax structures
Regarding policy instruments, we …rst express each government spending item, which has already been written as share of H t , as a share of output. That is, we de…ne: g c t ), out of which only six can be set exogenously. Given that we wish to examine the implications of changes in the composition of taxes, we …rst examine the case in which changes in each of the distorting tax rates ( c , l ; k ), in turn, is met by changes in lump-sum transfers/taxes, e g o , holding the spending instrument rates at their data averages. This experiment helps us identify the general equilibrium e¤ects of each distorting tax policy instrument relative to a non-distorting base. We next examine the case in which changes in each of the three distorting tax rates, in turn, is met by opposite changes in each of the remaining distorting tax rates. As in the …rst experiment, the spending instrument rates are held at their data averages. Further details are provided at the beginning of Section 4 below.
Process for technology
We next specify the evolution of exogenous stochastic variables. Given the above assumptions, only total factor productivity, A t , is stochastic among 10 Note that t = t =H where h-superscripts are omitted in a symmetric equilibrium. the exogenous variables. Following usual practice in the RBC literature, we assume that A t follows an AR(1) process:
where A > 0 is a constant, 0 < a < 1 is the autoregressive parameter and " a t iid(0; . Public spending on education data are obtained from ONS. As our aim is to use the model to evaluate long-run growth and welfare around the steady-state, it is important that the calibrated parameters imply a sensible long-run solution. This provides the criterion for choosing those parameters we cannot retrieve from the data or previous empirical studies, especially the exponents in the production function for human capital.
Calibration
The numeric values for the model's parameters are reported in Table 1 . To calibrate the model, we work as follows. We set the value of (1 1 ) equal to labour's share in income (i.e. 0:601) using the ISDB dataset. Given labour's share, capital's share, 1 , is then determined residually. Following e.g. Baxter and King (1993), we set a 2 equal to the public investment share in GDP (i.e. 0:011), as obtained from the EO database. The population gross growth rate n is calculated using IFS data to be 1:003.
The discount rate, 1= is equal to 1 plus the ex-post real interest rate, where we use the ex-post real interest rate from MEI. This implies a value 0:976 for . Following Kydland (1995, ch. 5, p. 134), we set , the weight given to composite consumption relative to leisure in the utility function, equal to the average value of work versus leisure time, which is obtained using data on hours worked from the EO database. 11 Given the lack of relevant data, we follow the study by Baier and Glomm (2001) , and set the relative weight of public consumption services in composite consumption at = 0:1. We also use a value for the intertemporal elasticity of consumption (1= ) that is common in the DSGE literature (i.e. = 2). Regarding the …scal policy parameters, we employ data averages. For example, we use data from ONS to obtain the mean of public education spending as a share of GDP, which gives e g e = 0:049. EO data give e g i = 0:011 for the government investment spending share and e g c = 0:272 for the government consumption spending share. To avoid double counting in the government budget constraint, we have to adjust this ratio since government education spending is recorded as government consumption spending in the national accounts. Thus we set e g c = 0:272 0:049 = 0:223. We also use the e¤ective average tax rates from the ECFIN paper by Martinez-Mongay (2000) for 1970-2000, to obtain the average tax rates as k = 0:47, l = 0:265 and c = 0:185. 12 It is interesting to point out that, in the UK, labour taxe revenue is lower than in most of EU countries, while revenue from taxes on capital is higher than the EU-27 average and consumption taxes are below the EU-27 average. 13 The budget constraint then implies e g o = 0:169. It is important to point out that, given the above data averages, all tax regimes de…ned above imply the same long-run solution.
To accurately gauge the persistence of TFP shocks, we estimate the AR(1) relation given by (19) using TFP data from the ONS. The estimated values for a is 0:92 and is signi…cant at less than the 1% level of signi…cance. The standard deviation of this process, a , is 0:03.
A monetary valued measure for human capital is needed to calibrate the scale parameters A and B. In particular, model consistent values for A and B can be obtained by solving equations (5) and (11) using data averages, long-run values and the other calibrated parameters.
14 As we require data for the endogenous variables as shares of human capital, it is important to obtain a monetary-valued measure of human capital that is comparable to monetary valued quantities such as consumption, income, physical capital and government spending. To our knowledge, such a measure does not exist for the UK. In our related work for the USA (see Angelopoulos et al. (2007b) ), we used data on human and physical capital from Fraumeni (1989, 1992a,b) . 15 These measures are reported in billions of constant 1982 12 These are the e¤ective average tax rates KITN, LITR and CITR respectively in Martinex-Mongay (op cit.).
13 See e.g. the Eurostat statistical book, edition 2007, on "Taxation trends in the European Union" for a rich presentation of taxation in all 27 member countries of the EU.
14 For this exercise, we obtain a model consistent y. In particular, y is found from equation (17b), using EO and ONS data. As a dataset for the share of time individuals spend on education as opposed to work or leisure is not available, we acquire a proxy for e to calibrate B. This is achieved by assuming that agents spend on average 16 years on education over the 62 minus 6 years available on average for work or education, so that agents allocate 28:6% of their non-leisure time to education as opposed to work. Non-leisure time is found using data on hours worked, obtained from EO. 15 Generally, empirical studies use measures of school enrolment ratios or years of schooling as general proxies of labor quality or human capital. However, in our setup, these dollars for 1949-1984. The basic idea used in the construction of this dataset is that the output of the education sector is considered as investment in human capital. 16 Unfortunately, such data are not available for the UK. We use, however, the Fraumeni (1989, 1992a,b) dataset, by setting the depreciation rate for human capital to the value they calculate, so that h = 0:0178. We also assume that the depreciation rate for physical capital is at 5%, the level calculated by Jorgenson and Fraumeni, and also set the same depreciation rate for public capital. Note that the depreciation rates matter for the long-run value of the investment share in GDP, but have little e¤ect on near steady-state dynamics in this class of model (see e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999, p. 954).
To construct a measure of human capital, we use education spending data from OECD Statistics, following Harbenger's (1978) approach 17 This data is then re-scaled by a factor that we …nd in the U.S. data 18 . We then use this measure to construct the data averages needed for the calibration of A and B.
Given the functions for the calibration of A and B, we calibrate 1 and 2 so that we obtain an economically meaningful and data-consistent long-run solution. In particular, to ensure that the balanced growth rate is equal to the data average of 1:024, we set a value of (1 1 ) = 0:49 for the human capital externality (which implies that the productivity of individual human capital is 1 = 0:51), and a value of 2 = 0:05 for the productivity of public proxies are measures of the input to the production function of human capital (time spent on education) and not of the output of this activity, new human capital. 16 In this context, Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992a) note: "investment in human beings, like investment in tangible form of capital such as buildings and industrial equipment, generates a stream of future bene…ts. Education is regarded as an investment in human capital, since bene…ts accrue to an educated individual over a lifetime of activities". Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989) also note that "in order to construct comparable measures of investment in human and nonhuman capital, we de…ne human capital in terms of lifetime labor incomes for all individuals in the US population. Lifetime labor incomes correspond to asset values for investment goods used in accounting for physical or nonhuman capital". 17 Conolly (2004) provides an example of the Harbenger method which is essentially a variant of the perpetual inventory method. For example, to initialize the capital series, education spending in the …rst period is divided by the net growth rate of education spending and by the assumed depreciation rate of human capital. For the other periods, human capital is equal to the un-depreciated human capital of the previous period plus new spending on education. 18 We used Harbenger's method on NIPA accounts data on education spending in USA and compared the resulting human capital series to the human capital measure given by Jorgenson and Fraumeni. We found that Harbenger's method underestimates the average value of human capital, so we used the degree of proportionality between the two series in USA to re-scale Harbenger's human capital series for the UK. education spending. The value of the gross growth rate of 1:024 is the growth rate of labour productivity for the UK, calculated using ISDB data.
Regarding the calibrated values of 1 and 2 , it is important to report the following. For higher externalities, the growth rate becomes too low. This happens because, with very high externalities, there are free riding problems in the creation of human capital. On the other hand, for low externalities, the implied share of time allocated to education (e) in the long-run increases and also the growth rate increases to unrealistic values. The same movements are observed with changes of 2 , although to a lesser extent. By contrast, our calibrated values (1 1 ) = 0:49 and 2 = 0:05 guarantee a growth rate consistent with the data average growth of labour augmenting technology of 2:4%. Finally, note that the calibrated value for 2 is also approximately equal to the government education spending share in GDP.
Steady-state solution
The steady-state solution implied by this calibration is reported in Table 2 . As can be seen, the long-run solution for all variables is close to the data average, or, in the case of the capital shares in GDP, the implied long-run value using data on private and public investment.
Regarding the allocation of time, there are no data that decompose total time in work, education and leisure. However, survey data on hours worked from EO, indicate that agents who work, allocate about 65:3% of their time to leisure. Hence, the model's long-run solution is compatible with the assumption that agents who educate themselves make the same e¤ort/leisure choice, so that total leisure time in the labour force is 67:5%. In addition, the model solution indicates that the breakdown of non-leisure time to work and education e¤ort is roughly two thirds to work and one third to education. This is again consistent with the average percentage of the years agents allocate to education over the total number of years available for work and education (i.e. 16=(62 6)). To sum up, this model economy for the UK is consistent with externalities in private human accumulation and productive public education expenditure. Lucas (1988) supports a value of human capital externality of 0:4, but (since his externality is modeled as a direct argument in the goods production function) its e¤ect on output produced is much higher relative to our calibrated externality. The associated value of the productivity of public education expenditure, 2 = 0:05, and the value of the productivity of public capital, a 2 = 0:011, are also within the range assumed in the related literature (see e.g. Blankenau (2005) p. 501).
Results: Growth and Welfare
Using the solution of the second-order approximation of the model around its deterministic steady-state, we now examine the e¤ects on the long-run growth rate and expected lifetime utility from changes in the composition of taxes focussing on the policy scenarios introduced in subsection 2.5.
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After de…ning long-run growth and welfare in subsection 4.1, subsection 4.2 studies the e¤ects of increases in one of the distorting tax rates ( c , l ; k ), which is met by a decrease in the share of lump-sum taxes (or equivalently an increase in lump-sum taxes/transfers), e g o . Note that in each experiment, we only change one of the distorting tax rates at a time, allowing e g o to adjust to keep the government budget constraint satis…ed. Subsection 4.3 then analyses the e¤ects of replacing one distorting tax rate with another. In particular, we study increases in c accompanied by decreases in l ; increases in k accommodated by decreases in c ; and increases in l met by decreases in k : Again, we exogenously alter only one rate at a time. Finally note that in all policy experiments, we keep the GDP share of government spending …xed at its data average. 20 
Measures of long-run growth and expected lifetime utility
Long-run growth is simply measured by the balanced growth rate, , which is the common constant rate at which all quantities grow in the long-run of our economy. Welfare is de…ned as the conditional expectation of the discounted sum of lifetime utility (see eq. (1)). To this end, we …rst undertake a second-order approximation of the within-period utility function (see eq.
(2)) around the non-stochastic steady-state (see subsection 3.3) and then take the discounted "in…nite" sum of approximate within-period utility functions (see Appendices 6.2-6.4). We undertake this for varying levels of the tax rates using the solution(s) of the second-order approximation to the stationary equilibrium as given by equations (17a 19) . Note that in comparison to the related literature (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007)), we work with an endogenous growth model.
Replacing a distorting tax rate with lump-sum taxes
We start with a comparison of distorting tax rates ( c , l ; k ), when the lump sum instrument, e g o ; adjusts to satisfy the government budget constraint.
Growth e¤ects
First, consider the e¤ects of di¤erent tax rates on long-run growth. In Figure  1 , subplot (1,1), where (1,1) refers to row and column numbers respectively, we derive the consumption tax-growth rate relationship. Subplots (1,2) and (1,3) derive the labour tax-growth rate and capital tax-growth rate relationship respectively.
[ Figure 1 about here]
As can be seen, increases in any of the distorting tax rates, holding government spending other than transfers and other distorting tax rates constant, decreases the growth rate. This is as expected given the distortion of individual choices. It is worth noting that increases in the labour tax rate hurt growth more than increases in the other two tax rates. To better understand these e¤ects, Figure 2 plots the e¤ects of the three distorting tax rates on the main endogenous variables, education time, e, work time, u, private consumption, c, output, y and investment, i. There are three lines in each sub-plot in Figure 2 . The continuous lines with stars represent the e¤ects of changes in the consumption tax, c ; the dashed lines the e¤ects of changes in the capital tax, k ; and …nally the continuous lines the e¤ects of changes in the labour tax, l .
[ Figure 2 about here]
In general, Figure 2 suggests that increases in any of the three distorting tax rates have adverse e¤ects on all endogenous variables. Reference to output, consumption and investment in Figure 2 shows that the tax rate on capital has the largest adverse e¤ects followed by the labour and consumption tax rates respectively. On the other hand, when examining labour market variables, the negative e¤ects of the labour tax rate are higher than the capital tax rate. This follows since increases in the labour tax create important and direct disincentives for both work and education e¤ort. In particular, the labour tax reduces the return to labour and hence work e¤ort. Moreover, expected future returns to human capital also fall, thus, leading to a fall in human capital investment and education e¤ort. 21 This latter result explains why the net growth e¤ect of labour versus capital taxes is larger, as human capital growth is mainly determined by private education e¤ort. Also, since consumption taxes reduce education e¤ort by more than capital taxes, the growth rate is hurt more by consumption than by capital taxes. 22 To summarize, if the goal of tax policy is to minimize the negative effects of taxation on long-run growth, and if it is possible for the government to have a lump-sum tax policy instrument at its disposal, the above results suggest that higher capital taxes rates are the least harmful, followed by consumption and labour taxes respectively. In other words, the largest marginal contribution to increasing growth would come from cutting labour taxes. 21 Obviously, there are also income e¤ects in the labour markets, due to the changes in tax rates. As all tax rates decrease income, agents want to work more to make up for the loss in income. However, for all three tax rates, the substitution e¤ects from lower returns to work and education time dominate and hence work and education time are reduced in all cases. 22 The reason that consumption taxes decrease work and education e¤ort time is that as consumption becomes more expensive, agents tend to substitute consumption for leisure. The reason that capital taxes decrease work and education e¤ort is that these taxes reduce the return to the labour input (in addition to decreasing the return to the capital input) in the production function, as human and physical capital are complements in the production process.
Welfare e¤ects
We next consider welfare as de…ned above. The welfare curves for changes in c , l and k respectively, being met by changes in e g o are shown in subplots (2,1), (2,2) and (2,3) in Figure 1 . Again, increases in any of the distorting tax rates results in decreases in welfare. In our model, welfare depends on the time-paths of the equilibrium solutions for composite consumption, growth and leisure time (see the calculations in the Appendix). 23 As we see in Figures 1 and 2 , higher tax rates imply less consumption, less growth and more leisure time (as both work and education time fall with higher tax rates). The …rst two e¤ects dominate so that welfare falls as distorting tax rates rise.
It is interesting to note that welfare falls more under higher capital tax rates, compared to higher labour and consumption tax rates. This is despite the fact that the fall in the growth rate was larger under higher labour and consumption tax rates (see above subsection). The welfare result pertaining to capital taxes is due to the large negative e¤ect that these taxes have on consumption, and also on the fact that leisure is not increased as much by higher capital taxes as by higher labour and consumption taxes (see Figure  2 ). Comparing labour and consumption taxes, we see that the adverse e¤ect of the former is larger although any di¤erences are small. Again, labour taxes have larger negative e¤ects on consumption, but since they also have larger positive e¤ects on leisure, the quantitative welfare di¤erences between these two tax rates are small.
To formally compare the quantitative welfare e¤ects of di¤erent distorting tax rates, we follow e.g. Lucas (1990) , Cooley and Hansen (1992) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), and compute the welfare gains, or losses, associated with alternative tax mixes by computing the percentage change in private consumption that the individual would require so as to be equally well o¤ between two policy regimes. This is de…ned as " " (see Appendix 6.5 for the derivation of in our model). Subplots (3,1), (3, 2) and (3, 3) show, respectively, the welfare gain/loss from consumption over labour taxes, consumption over capital taxes and labour over capital taxes -for a range of values of e g o . In accordance with our previous discussion, we see …rst that there are welfare gains from higher consumption tax rates as opposed to either higher labour or capital tax rates, as well as from higher labour as opposed to higher capital tax rates 24 . On the contrary, and for symmetrically opposite reasons to those explained above, there are welfare losses from decreasing consumption as opposed to decreasing either labour or capital tax rates, and from decreasing labour as opposed to decreasing capital tax rates. The second observation is that the welfare e¤ects seem to be large in magnitude, especially when the comparison is with respect to capital taxes. The additional gains from higher consumption or labour tax rates, instead of capital tax rates, amount to 2% of consumption for each additional percentage point of e g o . To summarize, if the goal of tax policy is to minimize the detrimental e¤ects of taxation on expected lifetime utility, the above results indicate that higher consumption tax rates are least harmful followed by labour and capital taxes respectively. In other words, the largest marginal contribution to welfare would come from cutting capital taxes. This is also checked below.
Replacing one distorting tax rate with another one
In this subsection, we assume away the possibility of changes in lump-sum taxes/transfers, and instead evaluate the growth and welfare e¤ects of replacing one distorting tax rate with another. The e¤ects on long-run growth and welfare are presented in Figure 3 , while Figures 4 and 5 present e¤ects on other endogenous variables.
Growth e¤ects
The e¤ects on the growth rate from increases in the consumption tax rate, when the labour tax rate is reduced, are shown in Figure 3, subplot (1,1) . Subplots (1,2) and (1, 3) show respectively the growth e¤ects from increases in the capital tax rate when the consumption tax rate is reduced, and from increases in the labour tax rate when the capital tax rate is reduced. In all experiments, all the other policy rate components in the government budget constraint remain unchanged.
Note …rst that increases in labour taxes vis-a-vis both capital and consumption taxes hurt the growth rate (see subplots (1, 3) and (1,2) respectively). In addition, capital taxes hurt the growth rate more than consumption taxes, but the e¤ects in this case are trivial (see subplot (1, 2) ).
[ Figure 3 about here]
In Figure 4 , we present the e¤ects on other endogenous variables from changes in the two income tax rates ( l and k ), when accommodated by changes in the consumption tax rate,
c . There are two lines in each sub-plot in Figure 4 . The continuous lines present the e¤ects of changes in the labour tax, l , met by changes in c , while the lines with stars present the e¤ects of changes in the capital tax, k , met by changes in c . This …gure helps us to better understand the e¤ects of income (labour and capital) tax rates vis-a-vis the consumption tax rate. As can be seen, substituting a reduced income tax rate for a higher consumption tax rate has positive e¤ects on output, consumption and investment, which are larger when it is the capital income tax rate that is reduced. Regarding the labour market, lower labour income tax rates result in increases in both work and education e¤ort time as the returns to work and education get higher, while lower capital income tax rates result in a decrease in work and education e¤ort time. In this case, it is the income e¤ects that dominate (recall that income is increased when the capital tax rate is decreased) so that agents can a¤ord to enjoy more leisure time. These di¤erent e¤ects on education time explain why growth is reduced when labour taxes rise relative to consumption taxes, and why growth is increased when capital taxes rise relative to consumption taxes.
[Figures 4-5 about here]
In Figure 5 , we present the e¤ects on endogenous variables from switching from labour tax rates, l , to capital tax rates, k . As can be seen, increases in l ; met by decreases in k ; boost output, consumption and investment. On the other hand, work and education e¤ort time are reduced when l rises. In this case, both the substitution (higher labour tax) and income e¤ects work in the same direction in the labour market. Hence, the fall in the growth rate when l rises and k falls. To summarize, if the goal of tax policy is to promote long-run growth by altering the distorting tax rates, our results suggest that labour taxes should be reduced, while simultaneously increasing capital or consumption taxes to make up for the loss in labour tax revenue. However, the gains in terms of growth from such changes in the tax structure are found to be very small, in accordance with the results in Lucas (1990) and Stokey and Rebelo (1995) . In particular, if the tax rate on labour was reduced to 20% (starting from the data average of 26.5%), the net growth rate would increase to 2.46% (when the capital tax increases) or to about 2.44% (when the consumption tax increases), from the data average of 2.41%.
Welfare e¤ects
The welfare curves are shown below their respective growth curves in Figure  3 . As can be inferred from subplots (2,1) and (2,2), higher consumption tax rates, met by reduced tax rates on labour or capital are welfare improving. Compared to labour taxes, higher consumption taxes imply higher consumption (see Figure 4) and growth. They also imply less leisure, but the …rst two e¤ects dominate so that welfare rises as the ratio of consumption to labour tax rates goes up. Compared to capital taxes, higher consumption taxes again imply higher consumption and leisure. They also imply less growth but, since this adverse e¤ect is very small, the …rst two e¤ects dominate and welfare rises substantially as the ratio of consumption to capital taxes rises. Finally, in subplot (2,3), a higher labour to capital tax rate ratio, although bad for growth, is good for welfare. As can be seen in Figure 5 , the reason is that as labour tax rates rise and capital tax rates fall, both consumption and leisure rise and this increases welfare.
Finally, we turn to a quantitative assessment of how much these tax switches can bene…t the economy. We calculate the welfare gains/losses of increasing the ratio of consumption to labour, capital to consumption, and labour to capital tax rates. The results are presented in subplots (3, 1) to (3, 3) respectively in Figure 3 . In each case, the gains/losses are calculated with respect to the mean value of the respective tax ratios in the data. In each of the subplots, then, point zero on the vertical axis represents the current combination of tax rates in the UK.
The results suggest important welfare gains from re-allocating the tax burden away from capital to labour income and even bigger ones by shifting it to consumption spending. For instance, if the capital tax is decreased from its data average of 47% to 43%, welfare gains of about 1% of consumption can be obtained permanently if the loss in tax revenue is met by an increase in the labour tax. Whereas welfare gains of about 1.5% of consumption can be obtained permanently if the loss in tax revenue is by an increase in the consumption tax. Smaller welfare bene…ts are realized from substituting the labour tax with a consumption tax. For instance, welfare gains of about 0.2% of consumption can be made in this case if the labour tax is decreased from its data average of 26.5% to 23%. Note, these examples involve small changes in the tax rates (of about 10% change in the tax rates) that are within the historical (recent) experience for the UK. 25 Quantitatively, the welfare e¤ects reported here are similar to the e¤ects reported in Lucas (1990) , Cooley and Hansen (1992) and McGrattan (1994) .
To summarize, if the goal of tax policy is to promote welfare by altering the distorting tax rates, our results suggest that capital taxes should be re-duced, while simultaneously increasing labour or consumption taxes to make up for the loss in capital tax revenue. Our …ndings further suggest that it is also welfare improving, but less so, to reduce labour taxes, while increasing consumption taxes.
Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the quantitative implications of changes in the composition of taxes for long-run growth and expected lifetime utility in the UK economy from 1970-2005. We employed a DSGE setup incorporating a detailed …scal policy structure and where the engine of endogenous growth was human capital accumulation. The model was based on Lucas's (1990) model, which we extended by allowing for: (i) a more realistic disaggregation of government spending into its basic growth and utility promoting activities; (ii) a consumption tax; (iii) externalities from economy-wide human capital; and (iv) uncertainty in the model economy.
Our results suggest that the growth e¤ects of tax reforms are likely to be small, whereas the welfare e¤ects can be substantial. In particular, our results suggest that if the goal of tax policy is to promote long-run growth by altering relative tax rates, then it should reduce labour taxes while simultaneously increasing capital or consumption taxes to make up for the loss in labour tax revenue. In contrast, welfare promoting policy would be to cut capital taxes while concurrently increasing labour or consumption taxes to make up for the loss in capital tax revenue.The …ndings in this paper are similar to those obtained in similar studies for the U.S. and they also appear consistent with the important normative result that capital should not be taxed in the medium and long run (see e.g. Chamley (1986) and Lucas (1990) ).
where the partial derivatives in (A6), evaluated at the steady-state, are:
In the simulations, T = 300 years and the sample average for V is calculated using 1000 simulations. 26 
Welfare comparisons
Let X A t denote the contingent plan for per capita composite consumption associated with tax structure A; and X B t the contingent plan for per capita composite consumption associated with structure B. We can then, following e.g. Lucas (1990) , de…ne as the constant fraction of regime B's consumption process that a household would be willing to give up to be as well o¤ under A as under B. Hence, we write:
Solving for ; we obtain:
where, V 
